Clarence Thomas on Race

Much has been made of Justice Thomas' recent release of his autobiography "My Grandfather's Son." Critics and liberals alike of the Justice criticize him for selling out to the Republican Party and also being a hypocrite--striking down many of the policies which helped him get to the very seat that he sits in. He responds to these criticisms in this short segment from 60 Minutes after the release of his autobiography.

US Supreme Court Law Clerks: Part I

Is there declining diversity in the law clerk hires since the appointment of John Roberts and Samuel Alito?

Perhaps there is as Linda Greenhouse writes in a not-so-recent memo regarding the declining numbers of female law clerk hires by USSC justices.

Take a look at the article below:

Everyone knows that with the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the number of female Supreme Court justices fell by half. The talk of the court this summer, with the arrival of the new crop of law clerks, is that the number of female clerks has fallen even more sharply.

Just under 50 percent of new law school graduates in 2005 were women. Yet women account for only 7 of the 37 law clerkships for the new term, the first time the number has been in the single digits since 1994, when there were 4,000 fewer women among the country's new law school graduates than there are today.

Last year at this time, there were 14 female clerks, including one, Ann E. O'Connell, who was hired by William H. Rehnquist, the chief justice who died before the term began. His successor, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., then hired Ms. O'Connell.

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., who joined the court in January, hired Hannah Smith, who had clerked for him on the appeals court where he had previously served. So by the end of the term, and counting Ms. O'Connell twice, there were 16 women among the 43 law clerks hired by last term's justices.

After years in which more than a third of the clerks were women, the sudden drop was a hot topic this summer on various law-related blogs. Word of the justices' individual hiring decisions spread quickly among those for whom the comings and goings of law clerks are more riveting than any offering on reality television.

Who are these young lawyers who are the subject of such interest? They do not, contrary to myth -- propagated in part by law clerks themselves -- run the court. They do play a significant role in screening new cases, though, and they help their justices in preparing for argument and in drafting opinions.

While their pay is a modest $63,335 for their year of service, a Supreme Court clerkship is money in the bank: the clerks are considered such a catch that law firms are currently paying each one they hire a signing bonus of $200,000.

In interviews, two of the justices, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, suggested that the sharp drop in women among the clerkship ranks reflected a random variation in the applicant pool.

But outside the court, those who care about what goes on inside are thirsting for more than statistical randomness as an explanation.

A post on one popular legal Web site, the Volokh Conspiracy, asked, ''Why so few women Supreme Court clerks?'' and drew 135 comments during a single week in July. The answers included the relative scarcity of female students among the top editors of the leading law schools' law reviews -- an important preclerkship credential -- and the absence of women among the ''feeder judges,'' the dozen or so federal appeals court judges who, year in and year out, offer a reliable pipeline to the Supreme Court for their own favored law clerks.

Some speculated that Justice Antonin Scalia, who hired only two women among 28 law clerks during the last seven years and who will have none this year, could not find enough conservative women to meet his test of ideological purity. (Justice Clarence Thomas will also have no female clerks this year, but over the preceding six years hired 11.)

In a brief telephone interview, Justice O'Connor said she was ''surprised'' by the development, but declined to speculate on the cause.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed no such surprise. In a conversation the other day, she knew the numbers off the top of her head, and in fact had noted them in a speech this month in Montreal to the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, during which she also observed with obvious regret that ''I have been all alone in my corner on the bench'' since Justice O'Connor's retirement in January.

Justice Ginsburg, who will have two women among her four clerks, declined during the conversation to comment further on the clerkship numbers. Why not ask a justice who has not hired any women for the coming term, she suggested.

One who is in that position, Justice Souter, said he was disappointed to find himself without any female clerks. He explained that he had hired the top four applicants, who turned out to be men.

In recent years, more than a third of Justice Souter's law clerks have been women; since women rarely make up as much as a third of the applicant pool, he said, they have been somewhat overrepresented among his hires.

''I've found that a mix is a wonderful thing,'' he said, speaking from his home in New Hampshire.

Unaware of the overall drop in numbers, Justice Souter said he assumed it reflected no more than a random variation among this year's applicants.

That was also the assessment offered by Justice Breyer, who nonetheless has hired his usual total of two women for his four law clerk positions.

In the last seven years, Justice Breyer has hired more women than any other member of the court; more than half his law clerks, 15 of 28, have been women, a result, he said in an interview from his chambers in Boston, not of any conscious effort but of choosing the best available candidates.

With the number of women in clerkships high by historical standards until now, attention has been focused on a lack of ethnic and racial diversity among the clerks. There are no reliable figures, but the clerkship cadre remains overwhelmingly white.

It was not until the 1940's that any justice hired either a female or black law clerk.

Justice William O. Douglas hired the first female clerk, Lucille Lomen, in 1944, and it was 22 years before Justice Hugo L. Black hired the second, Margaret Corcoran. The first black clerk, William T. Coleman Jr., who is still practicing law here, was hired by Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1948.

Justice Frankfurter was not, however, ready to hire a woman when the dean of Harvard Law School strongly recommended a former star student in 1960. He turned down Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Response to America's View of an Increasingly Conservative USSC

A recent Washington Post article has found that an increasing percentage of Americans view the USSC as "too conservative." While about half of the respondents in a Washington Post-ABC News poll view the Court as issuing "balanced" decisions (perhaps as many ideologically conservative decisions as liberal decisions), there was a jump in the percentage that felt the Court was "too conservative": 31 percent, up from 19 percent in 2005. Those who felt that the Court issued "balanced" decisions also decline from 55 percent to 47 percent in the last two years since the nominations of CJ Roberts and Justice Alito.

The poll is interesting in trying to gauge and analyze how the general American populus views the Court. Given the fact that most of the decisions regarding abortion, race, and free speech this term have been quite complicated it seems that the majority of the Americans surveyed in this poll have oversimplified the issues and the opinions of the newly appointed justices currently sitting on the Court.

While the bottom line of these decisions (regarding abortion, race, and free speech) was against what one normally would view as a liberal position on these issues, the decisions themselves and how the justices reached their respective conclusions matters in how future justices and judges will interpret their decisions. Admittedly, the free speech test applied in Morse was slightly confusing and rather vague in its application, but those decisions regarding abortion and race all
are very careful in how they talk about restricting the rights of abortion and also the use of race in high school admissions.

Perhaps most of the sentiment among Americans about the shift in the High Court comes from what they read and listen to on a daily basis: the media. The media works under time constraints and caters to a public that does not necessarily have the time to digest complicated legal analysis or jargon. Perhaps the bottom line of these decisions is the only real thing that is communicated by the media to the public and having seen only the bottom line, the public perception of the Court and its justices' thinking is not fully understood.

Socio-economic Factors Fail in Creating a "Diverse" Student Body

A NY Times article reports that high schools are having trouble creating diverse student bodies using socioeconomic factors rather than race. The article reports when schools in San Francisco began considering other factors besides race to create a diverse student body, these plans did not work. While the premise of race correlating with income is fertile ground for creating a diverse student body in theory, in practice the experience of using such criteria has proved quite difficult.


What does this mean for the use of race in creating a diverse student body? It at the very least does not entirely foreclose the option of utilizing factors that favor certain races in designing a racially diverse student body. Justice Kennedy's opinion in the recent Seattle schools case therefore is very prescient in emphasizing the fact that in some cases race may actually be a useful means of selecting and rejecting certain applicants for high school admission. (Admissions to undergraduate and graduate education remain an entirely separate issue addressed in two other affirmative action cases).

The findings by the San Francisco schools also raise interesting questions about what exactly diversity means. What precisely constitutes a "diverse" student body? What's wrong with having an entirely black student body? For example, a high school student body could be composed entirely of black students. However, if one digs deeper, and gets to know each individual student, we find that some are children of wealthy doctors, lawyers or business men. Some come from housing projects nearby. Others are immigrants who recently came from Sudan as refugees and are learning English as a second language. Some of these students aspire to be artists, NBA basketball players, president, or the U.N. Secretary General. Would not someone say that this is a diverse group of students who could learn from each other's different experiences, talents, and backgrounds?

There are real and substantive differences between each individual student in the scenario that could provide educational benefits. Are the educational benefits even greater when these students can visually see differences in skin color? An interesting question that courts may have to confront one day (perhaps rather soon) in the future.

Race in Schools: A Move Beyond Integration to Diversity

Many journalists have categorized the recent decision regarding race-based assignments in high schools as a win for conservatives. After all the decision, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, seems to turn back the clock on progress that has been made regarding race and race relations in the United States.

Yet summing up the decision in so many words is not that simple. The 185 page decision is quite nuanced. The conservative plurality authored by CJ Roberts, and joined by Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Kennedy is quite careful in not striking down any race based means of achieving the high school's end goal of creating a diverse student body, but only goes so far as to say that purely race based means of doing so are unconstitutional. The opinion does not overturn any past precedent, but merely serves to clarify it. Kennedy's concurrence serves to emphasize this distinction.

He says:

"This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated societythat ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. Crude measures of this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school’s supply and another’s demand."

Both liberals and conservatives should agree that this crude classification of children solely on the basis of race is unconstitutional. It goes against the very meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. It would also go against the very individualized method of review that the Court in Grutter approved. The court made it explicit in the two University of Michigan affirmative action cases that the reason for approving one system of review and striking down another was the more individualized method of review where race was not equated with diversity, but one of many factors that could contribute to the meaning of diversity. Justice Kennedy should be applauded for upholding and making special note of this precedent, even though he did not join in the majority's opinion in Grutter.

The decision conforms to what much of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz have told us over the past 30 years. The days of pure race based integration measures for simply remedying for the effects of past discrimination are over. We have moved beyond integration for the sole purposes of integration. Integration serves a new goal now. That new goal is diversity. The goal, it appears, serves a dual purpose: 1) increasing education and tolerance among members of society and 2) remedying for the effects of past discrimination.

While remedying for the effects of past discrimination may not be necessary anymore at some point (as O'Connor prophetically said in Grutter that affirmative action measures would be expected to end in 25 years), it seems that as long as there is a society that values education and tolerance, race will be an ever present factor in discussions about diversity and society will never truly be colorblind.

Increasing Tension in Lower Court Nominations

It is well known among scholars of the law that most of the power to decide cases lies with lower court judges rather than courts of appeal or courts of review. The rationale is that higher courts, while they have the power of reviewing lower court decisions, do not have the time to review all of the lower court decisions and therefore they usually stand as the law.

However, it appears that there is always a frenzy over appointing judges at higher levels in the court system. Alito and Roberts are examples on the USSC. On lower courts, we saw in the summer of 2005 the contentious battles over the nomination of Priscilla Owens and Janice Rogers Brown for federal courts. Owens was finally confirmed for her seat on a federal appellate court and Brown now serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Recently, a similar, but less contentious battle over the Governor John Corzine's nominee for chief justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court has brought to light this battle over lower court nominees. Corzine nominated Stuart Rabner, former attorney general for the state, but some minorities in the New Jersey Senate criticized Corzine for Rabner's nomination citing the fact that not as much consideration was given to minority candidates.

Rabner was confirmed by a vote of 36-1 indicating that although there was concern over his nomination, this did not pose much of a threat to his nomination. It appears, therefore that either credentials were more important in state legislators decision to confirm Rabner or that his political ideology was in line with that of state legislators despite concerns over his race.

More on the Seattle Decision

An editorial today from the NY Times by Adam Cohen appears to agree with On the Docket's prediction about the USSC striking down the integrationist-tie breaker.

Yet, the editorial appears to contribute the decision mostly to the changing ideology of the Court rather than constitutional jurisprudence and precedent. Cohen rather harshly blames Justice Thomas for the predicted outcome of the Seattle decision.

It is hard to say, whether or not Cohen is right, but the evidence from the oral argument transcripts appear to point in the other direction. Liberals on the Court such as Justice Breyer and Justice Souter appear to be the ones whom Cohen should blame. Both Souter and Breyer upheld the affirmative action program seen in the University of Michigan Law School case in 2003, but it appears that they have a different take on the integration plan by Seattle. They do so not because they are not liberal, but rather because the motivations and rationale behind the Seattle integration plan are different. Applicants are chosen solely on the basis of race, rather than an individualized selection process which also takes into account academic merit of the applicants. Take a look at what was said during oral arguments:

JUSTICE SOUTER: Let me help you out by taking you back to my question. One of the characteristics of the affirmative action cases was the displacement of some other otherwise generally acknowledged relevant criterion such as ability as shown in test scores, grade point averages, things like that; and that was a characteristic of those cases.

It is not a characteristic of this case, as I understand it.

***

JUSTICE BREYER: But I think that the point that Justice Souter is trying to make, as I understand it, is of course there are similarities to Gratz, they can choose, but there's a big difference. The similarity in Grutter, or the difference in Grutter and Gratz is that you had to prod a school that was supposed to be better than others, that the members of that school, the faculty and the administration tried to make it
better than others. It was an elite merit selection academy. And if you put the black person in, the white person can't get the benefit of that.

Here we have no merit selection system. Merit is not an issue. The object of the people who run this place is not to create a school better than others, it is to equalize the schools. That's in principle and in practice, if you look at the numbers, you see that the six schools that were at the top, their position would shift radically from year to year, preferences was about equal among them. They have the same curriculum, they have similar faculties, and I don't think anyone can say either in theory or in practice, that one of these schools happened to be like that prize of University of Michigan, a merit selection system. That, I think, was a major difference that he was getting at, why is this not the same kind of thing? That was at issue in Grutter and Gratz. Now what is your response to that?

Cohen makes a weighty claim against Justice Thomas. Thomas, himself, as Cohen points out does, not say very much during the oral arguments, so it is hard to tell what is going on his his mind about the intergrationist tie breaker at this point. Given previous rulings, though, he will most likely vote against it. Yet, it appears that the Seattle decision will have more than just Thomas advocating against it.

Affirmative Action & Freedom of Expression

Two blockbuster cases await decision as the onset of June approaches and the 2006 term of the Supreme Court comes to a close.

The first case deals with the ability of public schools in the state of Washington to use race as a factor for assigning seats in high school assignments. Certain public schools in the city of Seattle are oversubscribed by public high school students and as such high schools use certain criteria to determine which students to accept. Race is the last factor among three others considered in the selection process.

Justices took great pains during oral argument, however, to make sure that they communicated the fact that the "integration tie breaker" used by the Seattle school districts is different from the affirmative action plan seen in the Grutter University of Michigan Law School case from 2003.

Because of this distancing from previous precedent upholding the use of race, On the Docket believes that USSC will strike down the integration tie breaker.

The second case deals with freedom of expression. Namely, the phrase, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," which was displayed during a public school parade in Anchorage, Alaska. During oral argument justices were quite concerned with the ability of school officials to ban this type of free speech (one which did not harm others) as too limiting a regulation in violation of the First Amendment. The justices seemed to imply that if they ruled in favor of the school, school administrators would then be free to regulate views of school teachers, books, and other learning materials that school adminstrators may perhaps not agree with.

It is therefore our prediction that the Justices will rule in favor of the students.