War on Terror Case Settled, Finally

Jose Padilla, whom the government designated as an enemy combatant, was convicted of all charges brought against him, signaling a major victory for the U.S. government in the war on terror. The sentence was brought about after a long and length court battle over Padilla's constitutional rights and charges brought against him which took the case all the way to the USSC in 2004 in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.

Check out more on the story here.

Going Beyond Unreasonable Searches & Seizures

The new law that Bush signed has violations of the 4th Amendment written all over it. According to an article by the NY Times, the new law both expands the definition of "electronic surveillance" and clarified the FISA act of 1978 to allow for warrantless searches.

The article reads:

“This more or less legalizes the N.S.A. program,” said Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, who has studied the new legislation.

Previously, the government needed search warrants approved by a special intelligence court to eavesdrop on telephone conversations, e-mail messages and other electronic communications between individuals inside the United States and people overseas, if the government conducted the surveillance inside the United States.

By changing the legal definition of what is considered “electronic surveillance,” the new law allows the government to eavesdrop on those conversations without warrants — latching on to those giant switches — as long as the target of the government’s surveillance is “reasonably believed” to be overseas."

Bush's decision goes against the general prevailing jurisprudence on this issue in the lower courts which have reviewed this matter. Recall that nearly a year ago on August 16, 2006 a Detroit district judge, Anna Diggs Taylor, ruled that the NSA terrorist surveillance program violated the 4th Amendment. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals failed to rule on the issue throwing it out on the justiciability doctrine of standing and thus refused to rule on the actual merits of the case.

No Constitutional Showdown Over Iraq in Near Future

There have been some whispers about a constitutional showdown between the President and Congress over the Iraq war. There are those in Congress who are against the war and against Bush's plans to continue the war until--as of yet--some undefined deadline. The constitutional question would be whether Bush's power as commander in chief, the sole organ of foreign policy, and the executive overrules the wishes of a Congress which has the power to declare war and raise and support an army.

Yet, the whispers about this constitutional showdown are unfounded. While the majority of Americans do not favor our continued presence in Iraq--since according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll only 31% of Americans approve of Bush's handling of the war--the American people's views do not necessarily correlate with the views of those in political office. Congress is much more divided on the war than the American people. Recently, Senate Democrats tried to filibuster a bill which would give Bush more time in Iraq, preventing the troops from coming home. To maintain the filibuster against the bill, Democrats needed 60 votes, but fell short of these votes coming in at 52-47 in favor of the filibuster. While a majority clearly did not want the bill, the divide in the Senate is not as big as the divided in the American population over the war in Iraq.

If courts ever receive a lawsuit over the Iraq war, most likely they will reject the case not on the merits, but rather on the justiciability of the case alone. The justiciability doctrine comprises four basic areas: standing, political question, mootness, and ripeness. Most likely judges and justices alike will refuse to enter into such a sticky legal and political case as one between the President and the Congress over one of the most contentious wars in our Nation's history. Courts may claim that in order for a Senator or a Representative to bring the case to court, they need a majority of Congress to sue the President and fulfill the requirement of standing. Not only a majority of the Senate, but Congress as a whole needs to be harmed in some way to have standing. If that criterion is fulfilled then Courts can dodge the question another way: the political question doctrine. It is elucidated quite well by Justice Brennan in the Goldwater v. Carter case.

"As set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries: (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"

Perhaps judges would say that in the charged political atmosphere prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention over the Iraq war. Terminating hostilities during war time have been decided by the USSC as powers given to both the President and the Congress. The answer is not a definitive one by any means. The U.S. Constitution itself is rather vague on who holds that power. But, it would be a rather contentious and difficult issue for courts to deal with and one that would likely not end up creating a happy resolution for either side. Courts may possibly use this reason as an excuse for stepping aside and letting Bush and Congress duke out the war on their own terms.

Composition of the Court & the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program

The controversy over the NSA terrorist surveillance program may actually have some connection to the current composition of the Court as it stands right now.

Recall that nearly a year and a half ago White House Legal Counsel Harriet Miers withdrew her nomination. The reasons given for her nomination were quite vague. While many speculated that she did not want to participate in a confirmation process which would cause both political parties much anguish, there was also one other factor. A quick read of her letter withdrawing her name from the nomination process sheds light on the fact that the White House may have been trying to prevent the public from perusing confidential documents, perhaps regarding the NSA terrorist surveillance program. The text of her letter reads:



Dear Mr. President:


I write to withdraw as a nominee to serve as an associate justice on the Supreme Court of the United States. I have been greatly honored and humbled by the confidence that you have shown in me, and have appreciated immensely your support and the support of many others. However, I am concerned that the confirmation process presents a burden for the White House and our staff that is not in the best interest of the country.


As you know, members of the Senate have indicated their intention to seek documents about my service in the White House in order to judge whether to support me. I have been informed repeatedly that in lieu of records, I would be expected to testify about my service in the White House to demonstrate my experience and judicial philosophy. While I believe that my lengthy career provides sufficient evidence for consideration of my nomination, I am convinced the efforts to obtain Executive Branch materials and information will continue.


As I stated in my acceptance remarks in the Oval Office, the strength and independence of our three branches of government are critical to the continued success of this great nation. Repeatedly in the course of the process of confirmation for nominees for other positions, I have steadfastly maintained that the independence of the Executive Branch be preserved and its confidential documents and information not be released to further a confirmation process. I feel compelled to adhere to this position, especially related to my own nomination. Protection of the prerogatives of the Executive Branch and continued pursuit of my confirmation are in tension. I have decided that seeking my confirmation should yield.


I share your commitment to appointing judges with a conservative judicial philosophy, and I look forward to continuing to support your efforts to provide the American people judges who will interpret the law, not make it. I am most grateful for the opportunity to have served your administration and this country.



Most respectfully,


Harriet Ellan Miers



While there is no conclusive proof of what these documents were, it remains interesting to speculate that these documents contain secrets about the NSA terrorist surveillance program.

No New Jurisprudence in Enemy Combatant Decision

While much has been made of the decision of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals to curtail powers of the president to declare civilians "enemy combatants" and hold them indefinitely without trial, the Court of Appeals appears to only affirm what the USSC decided in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004). Justice O'Connor wrote:

While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 233–234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled"); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 401 (1932) ("What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions").

In sum, while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.

Indeed, the 4th Circuit's decision (oddly enough one which was overturned in the Hamdi case) falls in line with the Court's reasoning approximately 3 years ago. Indefinite detention of so-called "enemy combatants" is unconstitutional and unsound use of governmental power.

Primarily Primary Confusion

A lot of attention has been garnered by the recent presidential debates which are ostensibly gearing up for next year's primaries. With all of the recent changes in the primary system for voters it has become quite a confusing mess. It was confusing even before the changes. Who actually knows what the difference is between a primary and a caucus anyway? (For more information see Professor Stephen Wayne's book, The Road to the White House).

Approximately six years ago, the USSC handed down an influential decision, California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000) regarding the primary system in the state of California (and obviously other states which had similar systems). California operated what they called a "blanket primary" in which register voters (not registered with any specific party, but simply registered to vote) could choose their favorite candidate across party lines. (In most cases, voters must be registered with a particular party and then vote for only a candidate within that party). The California Democratic Party filed suit against the Secretary of State for violating the First Amendment right of political parties to freedom of association.

In a 7-2 decision, the Court struck down the blanket primary. In short the opinion, which was authored by Justice Scalia, said that the state of California could not provide a compelling enough of a reason for violating political parties' rights to freedom of association. Parties need to be able to exclude those that do not associate with it in selecting their nominee, or else the party's views will not be represented adequately. Scalia writes:

"In no area is the political association’s right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee. That process often determines the party’s positions on the most significant public policy issues of the day, and even when those positions are predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador to the general electorate in winning it over to the party’s views."

Granted, that this is the case, it is still not understandable why getting a candidate whom the party likes matters at all. If this country was founded on democratic principles of a "government by and for the people" then why not open up the selection of candidates for a particular party to everyone? These candidates will eventually have to face all enfranchised voters anyway and if the majority of the population does not like either, then the election would be less fair. The majority of people who vote in the general election would have the least say at the most crucial stages of the game.

Framed in another way, the party's desire to be exclusive truly limits the value and of diverse veiwpoints and perspectives instead of increasing them. While Scalia writes that these types of candidates, since they must accommodate a range of views from the population, only become more "centrist" he refers to no social science or actual data. It is a weighty statement with nothing to back it up except general theorizing. In addition, it assumes that politicians cannot find ways to accommodate a diverse range of views while still satisfying most of their party platform. It is unlikely that candidates will be able to campaign for the general election anyway with the entire party platform intact since they will have to compromise then on issues to gain voter support. The rationale is messy since it really delays what inevitably happens: candidates will need to figure out ways to appeal to the entire population, if they are to be elected.

White House Response to Khadr Ruling

The White House, today, issued a response to the Khadr ruling saying that it disagreed with the judge's decision. Judge Brownback's ruling seems to have also spurred a similar ruling later on yesterday by another judge in looking at a case brought against Salim Ahmed Hamdan.

The article appears to confirm that On the Docket's suspicions are right about the refiling of Khadr's charges. The article reads:

"'Judge Brownback did not question that the military commission would constitute the appropriate forum in which to try a member of al-Qaeda for alleged war crimes,' said Maj. Beth Kubala, a spokeswoman for the Office of Military Commissions. "He determined that, as a technical matter, the existing CSRT definition was not identical to the definition under the MCA."

Military officials said yesterday that they could restart the tribunal process to allow them to add the word 'unlawful' to their records. Officials maintained, however, that the tribunals have largely concluded that the detainees are members of al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups and therefore their battlefield actions are inherently unlawful. Khadr will not be released following the decision."

Showdown between Courts & Congress over Military Tribunals yet again?

The Washington Post reports that Omar Khadr, the 15 year old child soldier who was caught in Afghanistan, is now free of the charges brought against him by the government. The judge presiding over the case, Army Col. Peter Brownback, dismissed all charges on the basis of the Military Commissions Act which allows military tribunals to try only "unlawful alien enemy combatants." Khadr was categorized as simply an "alien enemy combatant" by the Bush administration.

The Military Commissions Act was passed by Congress in response to the USSC decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) which declared among other things that the Court could decide whether or not the military tribunal for Hamdan was justified. It found that the tribunal was not justified because it violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention. In short the decision rebuked the government's assessment of the lawfulness of these military tribunals. Now, the act which was created to limit the court's powers in looking at these tribunals is being used against the government. There appears to be a battle going on between courts and Congress over this matter yet again.

In defining the ability of the military tribunals to try only "unlawful alien enemy combatants" the government did not intend to exclude people such as Khadr who were not associated with any particular government engaged in a war with the U.S. He was a member of Al-Qaeda, not part of a regularly constituted body of people fighting on behalf of a state such as an army or navy.

Most likely the government will reclassify Mr. Khadr and send him before the tribunal again. Hopefully we will get to the interesting legal question soon about how the court will deal with the fact that Mr. Khadr was only a child (under our laws) when he committed war crimes on behalf of Al-Qaeda.

Children at Guantánamo Bay

Today's article in The New York Times regarding child soldiers detained during the "War on Terror" at Guantánamo Bay raises interesting questions about how children should be treated for committing war crimes.

The article explains that "the shrapnel from the grenade [thrown by the child]... ripped through the skull of Sgt. First Class Christopher J. Speer, who was 28 when he died.To American military prosecutors, Mr. Khadr is a committed Al Qaeda operative, spy and killer who must be held accountable for killing Sergeant Speer in 2002 and for other bloody acts he committed in Afghanistan. But there is one fact that may not fit easily into the government’s portrait of Mr. Khadr: He was 15 at the time."

Mr. Khadr is now 20. International law does not prohibit people under 18 from being tried for crimes of war. Lawyers for Mr. Khadr argue that instead of being perceived as a war criminal, he should be thought of as a victim of warfare. The article reads:

"The prosecutors, they say, included in their charges acts that occurred when Mr. Khadr was younger than 10. Mr. Khadr “was subject to undue adult influences,” said Muneer I. Ahmad, an associate professor at the American University Washington College of Law, who has represented Mr. Khadr.

'If Omar had had his free choice,' Professor Ahmad said, 'what he would have chosen to do is ride horses, play soccer and read Harry Potter books.'"

Speculation about what Mr. Khadr would have done if he were not subject to "undue adult influences" is a start. But what should concern lawyers and advocates even more now is what Mr. Khadr will do if he is acquitted of these charges. Would he willingly commit acts against the U.S. now that he is an adult (according to law) and can make his own choices? This should really be the concern of advocates on both sides of the issue.

Bush Warms to Policies Addressing Climate Change

Signaling a change from his position of refusing to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol, Bush called upon 15 other nations today to "reduc[e] greenhouse gas emissions to 50 percent below 1990 levels by 2050."

His announcement to work with other countries on reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases comes nearly two months after the USSC's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (2006) which allowed Massachusetts (and other states) the power to force the EPA to regulate and curb the emissions of greenhouse gases.

While no real conclusions can be drawn about the cause of the sea change in Bush administration policy toward climate change, one has to wonder whether or not the USSC decision had any influence upon Bush's decision. While the judiciary may be the "least dangerous branch of government," it certainly is not the least powerful of the three.